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Ever since the Aum sect carried out a nerve gas attack in the Tokyo underground in March 1995, the
likelihood of terrorist attacks with biological weapons (BW’s) has been a topic of public debate. In the
weeks following the September 11th attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. in 2001, the occurrence
of a number of cases of anthrax seemed to strongly support those who regarded the issue of whether
terrorists would use biological weapons as already settled, leaving open only the questions of when and
how such attacks were going to happen.
In fact, this use of anthrax leads to the question of whether a paradigm change has occurred in the
strategies and methods of terrorists, with biological weapons becoming a standard tool in the terrorist’s
repertoire.
Reviewed critically, the attack by the Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo reveals two facts: on the one hand,
the Japanese sect failed utterly in their attempts to produce biological agents and to use them as a
weapon; on the other hand, none of the obstacles that were considered to affect the motivation of groups
like Aum to obtain BW’s had any effect. The old worldview that terrorists are unlikely to use biological
weapons has been thrown into question.
The nature and the course of the terrorist attacks in the US can still be interpreted in a number of
ways, however, all interpretations agree on two factors that are of key importance. Firstly, not only are
Osama bin Laden and his organisation prepared to allow the death of thousands, they even make such
multiple deaths a central element in the planning of their attacks. In this way, the old ‘rule’ of terrorism
research, which maintains that terrorists are interested in creating large numbers of spectators but not of
victims of their attacks, is challenged. Secondly, the use of pathogens in biological weapons, in the way
seen recently, adds a new string to the terrorist’s bow. However in this case, BW’s were not used for
mass destruction, nor is there evidence linking the attacks of September 11th and he anthrax letters. Talk
of a new paradigm would only be justified if one of these were the case. The claim of a new way of
thinking is, at best, premature and, at worst, leads to inappropriate political reactions.
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could be one of the first and, at same time, most dra-
matic, victims of the current focusing of the international public debate over the risk of biological weap-
ons. The most recent review of this, which took place in Geneva between November 19th and December
7th 2001, was blatantly sabotaged by the US. The inevitable collapse of the review process could only be
prevented by an adjournment until November 2002. The Biological Weapons Convention is the most
useful multilateral instrument currently available for the formation of a line of defence against the threat
of bioterrorism, amongst others. Failure would, therefore, be disastrous.
In the past, it has been thought impossible that terrorists could build nuclear weapons. This assess-
ment must, however, be reviewed. The theoretical principles are widely accessible to the public, with
such information even being available on the Internet. However, at an engineering level, many technical
details remain secret. The specialist capability and the techniques necessary for the ignition of nuclear
weapons can only be acquired through several years of experimentation, which could not be hidden from
the public. Therefore, a terrorist organisation would need the cover and protection of a state like Af-
ghanistan. Given such protection, it would then be possible, in principle, for a terrorist organisation to
develop the ignition technology, even without nuclear material.
II
The most difficult hurdle for a terrorist organisation is the procurement of nuclear fuel – plutonium
or highly enriched uranium (HEU). In countries that are subject to the control of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an illegal attempt to siphon off some nuclear fuel is likely to be de-
tected at an early stage. The same is not true of those states that possess nuclear weapons but are not
internationally controlled, Particularly in Russia, the national instruments for protecting and recording
nuclear material are unsatisfactory. A few thefts have occurred and it is possible that terrorists have
already got hold of nuclear material. That a terrorist group has the capability to produce this material can
be ruled out. However, there are a few countries that have been or currently are suspected of developing
nuclear weapons. They could possibly have supported or could in future support a terrorist organisation.
Here, we discuss Iraq, North Korea, South Africa and Iran. A whole section is dedicated to Pakistan.
Pakistan has always stressed that it does not pass on its nuclear weapons. However, little is known
about Pakistani national security measures. It is not known whether religious fanatics could have access
to nuclear material and could pass it on to terrorists. Cooperation with Pakistan should be considered as
a means to achieve the physical protection of nuclear material.
For several years, there have been growing indications that bin Laden is attempting to get hold of
weapons of mass destruction. He has explicitly declared his wish to procure nuclear weapons and has
tried to buy HEU on the black market. It is said that he also attempted to procure complete small nuclear
weapons, so called “rucksack bombs”, originating from former Soviet stocks. A few years ago, a warn-
ing was issued that the stock of these weapons may no longer be complete.
Terrorists could transport nuclear weapons by sea or by land. Such transport would probably not be
discovered. A variant of nuclear terrorism that is technically much less challenging would be the use of
a radiological weapon. Such a weapon is detonated by a conventional explosion and distributes highly
radioactive material. Whole regions can, thus, be made uninhabitable. Another widely discussed sce-
nario involves a passenger plane, with full fuel tanks, being crashed into a nuclear power station. How-
ever, the terrorists would have to be capable of hitting the shield vertically, in a nosedive, and not just
scrape against it from the side. This is far more difficult than directing a plane into a high building.
Several strategies exist that could reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism. These encompass, first and
foremost, international cooperation to improve the security of nuclear material in Russia. It will also be
necessary to cooperate with the three de factonuclear weapon states, India, Pakistan and Israel, to in-
crease the security of their nuclear facilities and materials. Current risk scenarios have to be reviewed, as
they do not take into account the possibility that terrorists could aim for mass murder and are prepared
to commit suicide. It would be appropriate to cooperate with the IAEA, which is involved in a variety of
activities that aim to reduce the risks. The disposal of plutonium from disarmed nuclear weapons should
be pushed forward. A further problem is the lack of an overview of the nuclear weapons currently in
existence. An arms control treaty that includes the registration and disarmament of tactical nuclear
weapons could reduce the risk of theft.
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1. Introduction
The smoke over Manhattan did not quite reach the size of a mushroom cloud. Nevertheless, th
number of casualties was of the order that would be caused by a minor nuclear explosion. The idea
that terrorists have access to weapons of mass destruction is a nightmare that is occasionally dis-
cussed in the media. It is also an idea that governments and international organisations take seri-
ously. The American president, George Bush, regards terror with weapons of mass destruction as
possible1 as does the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed
ElBaradei.2
The September 11th terrorists aimed to maximise the death toll they inflicted. Future attacks will
always be compared to this one, therefore, the ambition of successive assassins might be to beat this
death toll. Acquiring the means of mass destruction, including biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons, would thus be the next step. Until now, terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass de-
struction have been considered as unlikely for two reasons: the perpetrators’ motivation for such acts
has been underestimated; and their technical abilities have been regarded as insufficient. The events
of September 11th have finally made it clear that mass murder can be a terrorist’s objective. The
extent to which they have the technical ability is another question.
In the history of terrorist attacks, examples of the use of biological and chemical weapons can be
found. Of those, the most prominent is the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo underground carried out by
the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo sect in March 1995, which lead to over 1000 casualties and 12 fa-
talities. Although the terrorists were unsucessful for technical reasons, there is no doubt that mass
murder was intended. There are also examples of attacks with nuclear material. Chechnyan terrorists
placed a container of radioactive Caesium-137 at the entrance to a Moscow park in 1995.3 The ra-
diation was not high enough to harm passers-by, however, if the terrorists had detonated the con-
tainer with conventional explosives, the area would have been strongly contaminated. A nuclear
weapon has not yet been produced by terrorists but it is uncertain whether this will continue to be
the case.
The aim of this report is to assess realistically the possibilities terrorists have to carry out attacks
with biological or nuclear weapons. Consequently, the question is raised as to the means available to
combat such attacks. In this context, informal technical cooperation, as well as broad political coali-
tions, will be essential. This report is divided into two parts, the first of which is dedicated to the
subject of biological weapons, the second dealing with nuclear terrorism.
1 President George Bush, No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict, remarks by the president to the Warsaw Confer-
ence on Combating Terrorism, 6/11/2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/11/20011106-2.html.
2 Mohamed ElBaradei, Some Major Challenges: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Ter-
rorism, statement to the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna,
29/10/2001, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/ 2001/ebsp2001n011.shtml.
3 Jim Puzzanghera: "New fear emerges: possible threat of nuclear warfare", M rcury News,2001.
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2. The (new) terrorists and the (old) biological weapons – time for a new
paradigm?
Since the mid 90’s, the possible acquisition and use of biological weapons by terrorists has increas-
ingly become a subject of discussion at a political level and in the media. At the same time, the
scientific debate has also grown, particularly in the United States. The anthrax cases that followed
the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., seemed to confirm dramatically the views
of those who regard the question of whether terrorists can use biological weapons as closed and who
are only prepared to think about whenand how such attacks are going to happen.
In a seminal essay, the former American senator Sam Nunn described this new terrorism and the
increased danger of the use of biological weapons by sub-national groups as the inevitable conver-
gence of two long-known threats that appeared after the end of the East-West conflict: terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.4
According to Nunn, this convergence is promoted by three developments that have reinforced
one another: Firstly, the collapse of the Soviet Union lead to a situation in which client states of the
former U.S.S.R. that were involved in terrorist activities in the past are now free of constraints once
imposed by the superpower.   Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has released an enormous
reserve of scientists, know-how, technology and materials that, due to poor control and a lack of
resources, can be accessed by interested states or sub-national parties. Thirdly, the Internet facilitates
distribution of information that is relevant to NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) weapons and
is of great assistance to potential terrorists wishing to use biological weapons. The spectrum of
interested parties, as identified in the worst-case scenarios of those believing in the rise of this new
terrorism, comprises several ‘rogue’ states, traditional terrorist groups, "ideologically motivated
sects and dissatisfied political groups", as well as individual assassins who want to use biological
weapons to influence “the development of global history”.5 It is argued that, for such groups, the
political and moral, as well as the technological and organisational, barriers that stand in the way of
the acquisition and use of biological weapons for terrorist purposes have decreased.
The nerve gas attack in the Tokyo underground in March 1995 has often be called a ‘wake-up
call,’ refocusing political, journalistic and academic interests. In this incident, members of the
apocalyptical sect Aum Shinrikyo released the nerve gas sarin in several underground trains. The
nerve gas attack killed 12 people and injured over a thousand.6 The terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Centre in 19937 and on the government building in Oklahoma City in April 19958 reinforced
4 Sam Nunn, Terrorism Meets Proliferation: A P st-Cold War Convergence of Threats, in: The Monitor.  Nonprolif-
eration, Demilitarization and Arms Control, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1997, p.1, p. 3 f.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 See David E. Kaplan, The Cult at the End of the World, 1998; Milton Leitenberg, The Experience of the Japanese
Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents, in: Brad Roberts (ed.): Hype or Reality: The ”New Terrorism” and
Mass Casualty Attacks, Alexandria, VA: CBACI, 2000, pp.159-170.
7 See John V. Parachini, The World Trade Center Bombers, in: Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.): Toxi  Terror  Assessing
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, C mbridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 185-206.
8 See Jessica E. Stern, Larry Wayne Harris, in: Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.): Toxic T rror. Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp.227-246.
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the perception in the US that modern societies – particularly US society – are increasingly vulner-
able to terrorist attacks. Today, with regard to the use of the anthrax bacterium, the question is raised
whether a change of paradigm has occurred in the field of terrorist strategy and methods, owards the
idea that biological weapons are becoming standard tools of the terrorist repertoire.
2.1. The old paradigm
Looking back over the history of terrorism, the use of biological weapons has only been considered
in a minute fraction of all terrorist acts.9 The terrorists’ classical repertoire consists of attacks on
individuals or groups, including kidnapping, murder, bomb attacks, hijacking of planes, taking of
hostages and others. Various intertwined causes can be identified in the literature, which explain the
terrorists’ reluctance to use or to threaten to use biological weapons.10
· The effects occurring after the release of biological weapons cannot be controlled. This is
true for non-contagious pathogens like Bacillus anthracis, the organism that causes an-
thrax and even more so for pathogens causing contagious diseases, like, for example, Vari-
ola major, the virus that causes small pox. Instead of having an overwhelming efficiency,
the effects of such bioweapons could just ‘fizzle out’ (see the example of Aum Shinriky
below).
· Terrorists may be afraid of infecting themselves with the pathogen.
· Terrorists usually have an aversion to producing large numbers of casualties.
· There is an additional moral barrier, as the mass use of biological weapons would hit the
ill, the old and children the hardest. These are not, however, the primary targets of terrorist
activities.
· The use of biological weapons might undermine support for the group by members or
sympathisers and might provoke a reaction from the government attacked. Together, these
might endanger the survival of the terrorist group.
· ‘Classic’ terrorist aims can be achieved without the use of biological weapons. As a matter
of fact, terrorists claims have not yet been made that are on a scale for which biological
weapons would appear a proportionate or adequate threat.
· It is possible that government sponsors request that the terrorist groups they support re-
strain their activities regarding biological weapons. The reasoning behind this is the idea
that whilst terrorist groups cannot easily be located and so make poor targets for retaliatory
strikes, the same is not true for the territory and infrastructure of a sponsor state.
9 See review and case studies in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.): Toxic Terror. Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
10 According to Ron Purver, Understanding Past Non-Use of CBW by Terrorists, in:Brad Roberts (ed.): Terrorisms with
Chemical and Biological Weapons. Calibrating Risks and Responses, Alexandria, VA: CBACI, 1997, pp. 65-73.
See also the detailed documentation by Purver: Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the
Open Literature, Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995.
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· A further factor explaining the lack of interest in biological weapons shown by terrorists is
the complexity of biological weapons programmes, as compared to traditional terrorist
means, such as car bombs.
· The properties of pathogens pose two problems with respect to terrorist aims: On the one
hand, an attack with biological weapons could be regarded as a natural outbreak of an ill-
ness – therefore, the terror group might have problems claiming responsibility for it. On the
other hand, the incubation phase between the release of the pathogen and the occurrence of
the first victims might destroy the link between cause and effect, an idea that goes against
traditional terrorist patterns of behaviour and might thwart an ‘optimal’ response by the
media.
These factors have been and still are being debated by experts. Nevertheless, until the 1990’s, a
combination of the factors listed above was widely accepted as sufficient explanation for the absence
of terrorist acts involving biological weapons as a means of mass destruction.
2.2. Aum Shinrikyo – The old world view is jeopardised
With the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo underground on 20th March 1995, the worldview described in
the previous section was shaken.  Twelve people were assassinated and more than one thousand
were injured and required medical treatment. The investigations that followed revealed that the use
of sarin was merely the sad culmination of a series of attempts by the Aum sect to use biological
weapons. This dramatic event marked a turning point, which caused the assessment of the probabil-
ity of terrorists using chemical and biological weapons to achieve their goals in future to change
fundamentally. However, one central element is regularly ignored when reference is made to this
attack: the complete failure of Aum’s bioweapon programme. However, analysis of the extent of the
BW programme and the reasons for its failure is essential for an adequate assessment of the event’s
importance.
The origin of Aum’s bioweapon programme can be dated back to the year 1990, when Aum sci-
entists tried to procure a culture of the pathogen Clostridium botulinum, which causes botulism. At
the same time, procurement programmes were started, to obtain laboratory equipment and growth
media, e.g. peptone. Three laboratories, or rather production plants, were equipped.
Despite the practically unlimited financial resources that were dedicated to the sect’s bioweapon
programme, all attempts to produce and use biological weapons failed. Shortly after the attempt to
get hold of Clostridium botulinum, tests were carried out to confirm the efficiency of the toxin pro-
duced. Three vehicles were equipped with aerosol generators and driven through Tokyo to the inter-
national airport in Narita and to US naval bases in Yokohama and Yokosaka.11 However, no effect
11 The following is based on Amy Smithson and Leslie-Ann Levy: taxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Threat and the US Response, Report No. 35, Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2000, pp.75-
91; William Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo’s Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?, in Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001, pp.289-301;  Milton Leitenberg, The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group
and Biological Agents, in: Brad Roberts (ed.): Hype or Reality: The ”New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks,
Alexandria, VA: CBACI, 2000
Terrorism using biological and nuclear weapons 5
of these actions could be observed. Previously, Aum had carried out laboratory tests with rats, which
proved negative. This leads to the conclusion that either the Aum scientists were unable to isolate or
culture Clostridium botulinum, or the amounts of toxin produced were insufficient to cause harm.12
Similar conclusions can be drawn about Aum’s attempt to cultivate and spread Bacillus anthra-
cis. Aum was only able to get hold of a non-virulent strain of the pathogen, used for the production
of vaccine. After a certain amount of the bacterium had been produced – the exact amount is still
unknown – a first attempt was made to distribute the supposed pathogen from the roof of a tower
block in Tokyo. Reports about this event can only lead to the conclusion that the production of an
aerosol from the solution of anthrax bacteria failed completely – nobody was infected with the
pathogen. Two further attempts to distribute the anthrax pathogen, by means of the same spraying
vehicles used previously for the botulinus toxin, also failed.
Moreover, Leitenberg destroys some other myths formed in the reporting of the Aum’s
bioweapon programme. He demonstrates, for example, that Aum’s dabblings with Coxiella burne ii,
the pathogen causing Q fever, consisted of nothing more than the procurement of a diagnosis test kit
from Australia. Also, it is more than doubtful whether Aum members were capable of isolating the
Ebola virus. Reports about a software application that allegedly enabled Aum to construct geneti-
cally modified pathogens turned out to be a hoax.13
Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that none of the moral, psychological or potentially opera-
tive barriers for the production and distribution of BW’S described above played a role in preventing
Aum from attempting to isolate and produce pathogens, transform them into a weapon-suitable form
and finally distribute them. This dealt a blow to the widespread ‘knowledge’ of terrorist groups’
aversion to bioweapons.
At the same time, Aum’s complete failure at an operative level, that is the procurement of viru-
lent pathogens, their mass production and distribution, is an important indication that the technical
barriers for all these steps towards a working bioweapon are higher than some sensational media
reports would suggest. On the contrary, the Aum example demonstrates clearly, that a simple uni-
versity degree in biology and practically unlimited financial means for the procurement of the mate-
rials and infrastructure required are not sufficient for the production and use of biological weapons.
Finally, it should also be noted that the attack with the nerve agent sarin was not imitated imme-
diately, as was feared. Traditional terrorist organisations remained true to their traditional means and
procedures and movements believing that the end of the world is near, like the Aum Shinrikyo sect,
apparently did not consider the Aum an example worth imitating. In fact, it took over six years until
a terror group or individual distributed pathogens as biological weapon in a ‘successful’ way, in
October 2001.14
12 For the latter see W. Seth Carus: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th
Century, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, July 1999, p.57.
13 See Milton Leitenberg, The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents, in: Brad Rob-
erts (ed.): Hype or Reality: The ”New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks, lexandria, VA: CBACI, 2000, in
particular pp. 164-167.
14 The disruptive potential of hoax bioweapon attacks and even of procurement attempts by criminal and terrorist indi-
viduals or groups and opportunistic attempts to gain attention should not underestimated, see the statistics by the Cen-
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2.3. The events of September 11th and the distribution of anthrax pathogens in the US – a
basis for a new paradigm?
The events in New York and in Washington, D.C., and the distribution of the anthrax pathogen in
half a dozen US states have undoubtedly ‘changed the world’. The question is, to what extent? After
the event, do we finally have to lay to rest the paradigm that says that terrorists are unlikely to use
biological weapons? Alternatively, do the anthrax cases represent an exception proving a still valid
rule?
Between October 4 and November 20, 2001 a total of 22 cases of infection with anthrax oc-
cured.15 Half of the total were of the inhaled form - that is infection occurred via the respiratory tract
while the other eleven cases were of a skin infection with anthrax.Five of e patients suffering from
the inhaled form of anthrax died. The letters that contained the anthrax were addressed to media
companies – American Media in Florida, NBC News, CBS News and the New York Post in New
York – or to representatives of the political system in Washington, D.C., that is to their staff. In
addition to these, post office staff who came into contact with the letters or simply worked at the
sites where the letters were sorted or forwarded were affected by anthrax. Finally, two individuals
were infected with anthrax and died for whom no link could be established to the anthrax letters. It
is assumed that in both cases, a member of hospital staff in New York and an elderly lady in Con-
necticut, their mail came into direct contact with the anthrax letters or crossed the same distribution
path.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other US government
authorities, all anthrax spores found were identical and were curable with antibiotics. This leads to
the conclusion that all the spores had the same origin and the strain from which they came was not
genetically modified to alter its resistance to antibiotics. Also, in all cases, the anthrax spores used
were in the form of a very fine powder, the particles of which had a size under 5 micrometers. It has
now been confirmed that the anthrax pathogen used belongs to the Ames strain, which was first
isolated in a laboratory in Ames, Iowa.16
This, however, is all that has been confirmed about the pathogen, its source and identity or in-
deed about those who used it. Speculation and contradictory statements dominate the debate about
the identity of the culprit. In principle, four different and more or less plausible scenarios can be
identified.
ter for Nonproliferation Studies, e.g. Gavin Cameron et al.: 1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving
Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials, in: The Nonproliferation Re-
view, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp.157-174.
15 Data come from: Daniel E Jernigan et.al.: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, United States, 2001: Epide-
miologic Findings, in: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol.8, No.10, October 2002, pp.1019-1028.
16 See Alex R. Hoffmaster et.al.: Molecular Subtyping of Bacillus anthracis and the 2001 Bioterrorism Associated
Anthrax Outbreak, United States, in: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol.8, No.10, October 2002, pp.1111-1116.
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2.3.1.Scenario 1: a repeat of Oklahoma – American terrorists are responsible for the
anthrax attacks
Immediately after the events became known, it was considered unlikely that an American terrorist
group or an individual – possibly from the extreme right – could be responsible for the outbreaks of
anthrax amongst politicians and commentators.17 However, this would not have been the first case of
American terrorists trying to get hold of biological warfare agents. The most prominent case of this
kind happened in February 1995, when the right-wing extremist, Larry Wayne Harris from Ohio,
ordered three vials of plague pathogen from the American Type Culture Collection, one of the largest
collections of microorganisms in the world.18 In the same year, the extreme right-winger Timothy
McVeigh carried out a bomb attack against a government building in Oklahoma City, killing more
than 150 people. At the time, this was the most ‘successful’ terrorist attack ever on American terri-
tory.
Indications supporting the hypothesis of American terrorists being involved in the anthrax at-
tacks can be found on the websites of several groups, such as, for example, that of Aryan Action,
which expresses sympathy with the September 11th attacks (and otwith their victims). In addition,
it is on record that representatives of extremist militia movements have expressed interest in BW’s
in the past. After all, religious fanatics, militant opponents of abortion and other ‘single issue terror-
ists’ have paved the way, at least psychologically, for an actual use of biological agents by an indi-
vidual or a group from this camp, by sending a number of threatening letters, although these have
not yet contained any pathogen.
The way anthrax was distributed speaks for the involvement of an American terrorist group: the
targeting of representatives of the media as well as of the political system promised the largest pos-
sible amplification of the effect, spreading fear and provoking an overreaction from the American
federal government. The helplessness increasingly displayed and the partly contradictory nature of
governmental representatives’ statements are all grist to the mill for those in right-wing extremist
groups who are inspired by the thought that the American political system does not serve the inter-
ests of the people. These groups do not want to kill a large number of citizens but want to undermine
belief in the political leadership of the country and in the system of government in a way that an
overthrow of the political establishment becomes possible. According to one representative of this
camp, even the use of tiny amounts of biological weapons is likely to be sufficient to reach this
goal.19
The amount of anthrax pathogen used so far leads to the suspicion that only small amounts were
available to the sender of the letters, consistent with the idea that the pathogen might have been
produced by a US terrorist groupo  was diverted from the US military biodefense program. The US
government also takes this scenario seriously, as could be seen when the government declined a
17 Only a few suppositions were different initially. See The Globe and Mail, 25/10/2001: "Clues point to domestic
culprits in mail case.  Homegrown source most likely, experts say, since only timing implicates foreign group”; New
York Times, 02/11/2001: “U.S. Groups Have Some Ties to Germ Warfare”.
18 See case study by Jessica E. Stern: Larry Wayne Harris, in: Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.): Toxic T ror. Assessing Ter-
rorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
19 See “ ‘Loner’ Theory Is Offered in the Bioterror Attacks”, In ernational Herald Tribune, 6/11/2001.
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resolution of the general meeting of the UN condemning the anthrax attacks, with the comment that
it cannot be ruled out that these were carried out by an American group.20 If the clues ointing to-
wards an American source of the anthrax attacks grow stronger, then no official confirmation should
be expected until the terrorists have been caught and deviced.
The „loner theory“, working on the assumption that a „lone, Western individual who has scien-
tific expertise and access to anthrax samples and a well-equipped laboratory“ is behind the anthrax
attacks seems to have been the most influential approach in the FBI-led anthrax investigation since
the end of 2001. Yet, although a person on which the investigation was focussing was identified at
the end of June 200221, the FBI at the end of 2002 did not seem to be anywhere near an answer to the
question of who was responsible for the antrax letters sent out 15 months before. This performance
has led to criticisms about the pace of the investigation being voiced and to conspiracy theories
surfacing.22
2.3.2.Scenario 2: American terrorists have access to a state programme
The second scenario complements the first, involving American terrorist groups or individuals, by
including the possibility of a link to a state bioweapon programme. In this respect, the distinction
has to be made between the terrorists having access to the programme of a foreign state, for example
Iraq or the former Soviet Union, and their making use of the infrastructure of the former offensive
US programme or more recent biodefense acivities. B cause of the structure and aims of these right-
wing groups, the first variation of this scenario is considered very unlikely and can in practice be
ignored.
The idea that American terrorist could have gained access to the remnants of the former Ameri-
can bioweapon programme, which was stopped by president Richard Nixon in the 60’s and was
wound up in the early 70’s, does not strike one as very plausible. However, this could explain the
highly processed state of the anthrax spores. In addition, the spores did not contain bentonite as a
chemical additive, which would have pointed to the Iraqi programme, but silica, as used by the
Americans.  It is also rumoured that the method used for the production of the particles corresponds
to that used in the US bioweapon programme, which was not a grinding procedure. Finally, the time
that has elapsed since the end of the US programme, more than 30 years, is not in itself, conclusive:
anthrax spores can survive for such a period of time if stored in suitable conditions. This can be
demonstrated by, for example, the decontamination measures required on the British island of Grui-
nard, just off the Scottish coast.23.
20 See “Bush Team Rejects U.N. Plan to Condemn Anthrax Incidents”, New York Times, 1/11/2001.
21 See Guy Gugliotta and Dan Eggen: 'Biological Warfare Experts Questioned in Anthrax Probe', The Washington Post,
June 28, 2002; Scott Shane: 'Scientist theorized anthrax mail attack', Baltimore Sun, June 27, 2002.
22 See for example Merryl Nass: The Anthrax Letters: More Disinformation? Were The Letters An Officially Approved
Wake-Up Call To The Biowarfare Threat?, available on the internet at
www.redflagsweekly.com/nass/2002_may13.html.
23 The British Army carried out field tests with anthrax on this island during the Second World War. The island had to be
decontaminated in 1986 to make civilian use of the island possible again.See “Grossbritannien erinnert sich: Anthrax
auf Gruinard”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/10/2001; and “Insel im Sturm. Die Bewohner der Gegend um die
Milzbrand-Testinsel Gruinard fürchten um den Ruf der Bay”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23/10/2001.
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Meanwhile, however, a different variation on this theme has become more probable: it is sus-
pected that a person with access to anthrax spores that have been produced recently in US laborato-
ries is responsible for the anthrax attacks. The Federation of American Scientists clearly demon-
strated the plausibility of this in a working paper, published at the end of November.24 This p ssibil-
ity has since been publicly taken more seriously by government officials.25 Both former and present
members of US army staff and also clients in the US government and university laboratories have
been included in the investigations.26
In the middle of these extended investigations, exploded the news that anthrax has indeed been
produced in a US military laboratory since 1992. Spores from this lab are identical to those sent in
the anthrax letters.27 This news followed on shortly from details, released in early September, about
American biodefense activities, which are considered problematic, to say the least. Both of these
lead to question of whether US behaviour conforms to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
The existence of anthrax pathogens of recent origin makes Scenario 2 significantly more plausible –
particularly, if one bears in mind that the pathogens produced in Utah were regularly sent by courier
across the continent to a different military facility in Maryland, without special security measures
being in place. In Maryland, the pathogens were killed and sent back. Naturally, the US armed
forces denied any ‘loss’ of pathogens. However, such a negligent handling of weapon-ready material
opens the door to potential misuse.28
2.3.3.Scenario 3: the attacks of September 11th and the anthrax attacks were carried out
by the same people
In the third scenario, it is assumed that the same people were responsible for the anthrax attacks and
the September 11th plane hijackings. The way the attacks were carried out and the number of fatal
casualties arising from the hijacking of the planes leave all previous terrorist activities of this kind
far behind. The use of BW’s represents a similar ‘quantum leap’ in the repertoire of terrorist attacks
– particularly if Aum’s operative and technical difficulties described above are considered.
At first, media reports about Osama bin Laden, who was allegedly able to get hold of pathogens
by mail, seemed to confirm Scenario 3.29 However, this method of procurement, if it was successful
at all, indicates that the big operational hurdles have possibly not yet been crossed, especially re-
24 See Barbara Hatch Rosenberg: A Compilation of Evidence and Comments on the Source of the Mailed Anthrax,
16/11/01, revised 29/11; “Anthrax I: Powder Produced Recently, Watchdog Says”,
http://nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2001_12_04.html#8
25 See for example „FBI Fears ‘Inside Job’ on Anthrax Attacks“, The Independent, 4/12/2001,
http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?dir=1&story=108217&host=1&printable=1.
26 See for example “Campus labs eyed after anthrax scares”, Christian Science Monitor, 10/12/2001,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1210/p1s3-ussc.html, “Anthrax: U.S. Military May Have Ties to Incidents”, Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 10/12/2001, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/ 2001_12_10.html, “University labs
inspected for bioterror isks”, CNN.com,  http://www.cnn.com/ 2001/US/12/12/inv.university.biochem/index.html.
27 See “Anthrax Matches Army Spores – Bioterror: Organisms made at a military laboratory in Utah are genetically
identical to those mailed to members of Congress”, Baltimore Sun, 12/12/2001.
28 See “Army says lab not necessarily source of Hill spores”, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/ dec01/2001-12-
17-army-lab.htm.
29 See for example Daily Mirror, 25/10/2001: “Bin Laden bought anthrax by mail order for £2 500”
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garding the production of BW warfare agents and their processing to make functional biological
weapons.
In view of how events have developed and with regard to the dichotomy of the number of cau-
salities and the choice of means that is reflected in them, the hypothesis that Osama bin Laden and
his organisation are the senders of the anthrax letters remains doubtful. After all, it should be noted
in this context that the mass murder of September 11th was carried out by conventional terrorist
means. The use of unconventional means, that is, in form of anthrax pathogens, claimed a number of
victims that could easily have been created by conventional forms of terrorist aggression. The differ-
ence in logic applied in selecting the means to reach a particular goal leads to the suspicion that the
culprits are not the same. In addition, the use of anthrax does not constitute a further escalating step
in bin Laden’s conflict with the US and regimes in the Middle East perceived to be US puppet
states. The longer a massive use of biological weapons fails to take place, the more probable be-
comes the assumption that the anthrax attacks that have occurred so far were carried out by an op-
portunist individual or terrorist organisation and have an entirely different motivation.
A further indication of the extent to which Al-Qaeda has access to weapons of mass destruction
can be taken from an interview Osama bin Laden himself gave to the Pakistani tabloid “Dawn” on
the 9 September 2001, which evidently took place close to Kabul. In the course of this interview,
Osama bin Laden declared
“if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical
and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.”30
The revealing point is that biological weapons are simply not mentioned. Thus this can be taken
as a further circumstantial indication that bin Laden and his organisation are not responsible for the
anthrax attacks in the US. Also, bin Laden’s threat to use chemical weapons does not necessarily
signify that the procurement activities of his organisation have actually been successful. In addition,
a BBC report claims that the threat of retaliation with nuclear and chemical weapons only appears in
the English version, not in the Urdu version of the interview.31 This would indicate that the ‘infor-
mation’ was designed for the English speaking audience and might simply be a piece of political
propaganda.
At the same time, the reference to chemical weapons revives memories of the alleged chemical
weapon plant in Sudan that was attacked and destroyed by US cruise missiles following the attacks
on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. According to the US govern-
ment, the pharmaceutical factory destroyed was a production plant for chemical warfare agents and
had clear links to Osama bin Laden. More recent information on possible al Qaeda experiments with
chemical weapons has been supplied by secret service sources claiming that the group has access to
possible production plants near Kabul and has carried out chemical weapon tests on live animals. 32
30 See “Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response”, interview by Hamid Mir, DawnWeb
edition at http://www.dawn.com, 10/11/2001.
31 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1648000/1648572.stm, 10/11/2001.
32 See “Al Qaeda Sites Point to Tests of Chemicals”, New York Times, 11/11/2001.
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2.3.4.Scenario 4: “Osama bin Laden meets Saddam Hussein” – the anthrax assassins
have a state sponsor
In the fourth scenario, the culprits are thought to come from the bin Laden terror network and are
thought to be supported by a state sponsor. The first choice amongst the circle of suspect states is
Iraq. The thesis of state support is backed up by arguments coming from three different sources. The
‘quality’ of the anthrax spores – the exact details of which are still not known – indicates that the
pathogen originates from a state programme, as for example carried out in the former Soviet Union
or in Iraq.33 Secondly, advocates of a conspiracy theory claim that the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
was already responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. The most prominent
advocate of this theory is the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Wool-
sey.34 After all, the Iraqi leadership and its official media offer evidence enough to support this the-
sis.35
There are, however, doubts about this scenario, too: firstly, it is not clear whether the anthrax
spores actually originate in a state bioweapon programme. According to reports in the media, there
are 30 to 40 laboratories in the US alone that would be capable of treating anthrax pathogens
‘chemically’.36 In addition, even if the spores originate from a state BW programme, Iraq is not the
only candidate. Some commentators consider Iraq a politically probable source for the anthrax at-
tacks as, according to the conspiracy theory, the Clinton administration dispelled suspicions that
Iraq could have carried out the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 in order to avoid a
military confrontation with Iraq. As this position is found predominantly in the Conservative camp37,
it should at least be asked whether other political intentions and calculations lie behind the untiring
propagation of the thesis of Iraqi support of the terrorists. After all, it comes as no surprise that
Saddam Hussein would like to claim leadership in the fight against the US but this is of little use as
‘evidence’ for an Iraqi involvement in or even authorship of the anthrax attacks.
2.4. New paradigm or temporary confusion? The attempt to classify the anthrax at acks
In a political field, a new paradigm should be claimed only when previous assumptions about the
central influencing factors and the causal connections between the relevant variables are no longer
able to give an adequate picture of the political reality.
Two factors are of key importance in the assessment of the new political reality regarding terror-
ism and bioweapons. Firstly, not only are Osama bin Laden and his organisation prepared to allow
33 See for example USA Today, 24/10/2001: “Anthrax, Weapons Compared. Investigators look at Iraqi, Soviet samples
to see whether they match letters' chemical mix.”; W shington Post, 25/10/2001: “Additive Made Spores Deadlier.”
34 See Woolsey in The New Republic, online edition, 13/09/2001: “The Iraq Connection. Blood Baath”; see also D ily
Telegraph, online edition 1/11/2001: “Saddam ‘still ready to use germ warfare’”.
35 See “the open letter” of Saddam Hussein in: Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main Service, 30/10/2001: “Letter
from President Saddam Husayn to Western Nations and Governments”, via FBIS.
36 Citation by Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the US Senate Committee on the Secret Service, as appeared in Chi-
cago Tribune, 27/10/2001.
37 See “Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein's War against America” by Laurie
Mylroie, published by the American Enterprise Institute 2001.
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the death of thousands, they even make such multiple deaths a central element in the planning of
their attacks. In this way, the old ‘rule’ of terrorism research, which maintains that terrorists are
interested in creating large numbers of spectators but not of victims of their attacks, is challenged.
Secondly, the use of pathogens in biological weapons, in the way seen recently, adds a new dimen-
sion to the terrorist’s repertoire. However, it is crucial both that BW’s were not used as means of
mass destruction and that a link between the September 11th attacks and the anthrax letters cannot be
established. Only if one of these conditions were met, the birth of a new paradigm could be pro-
claimed. Short of this, the claim of a new worldview is, however, at best premature and at worst
leads to inappropriate policies to remedy the problem.
In this context, it remains unclear whether the measures planned in the Patriot Actpass d by the
US Congress and the Bush administration will hit home or will utterly fail to address the core of the
problem. The assumption at the root of this act of law is that a lack of secret service and police intel-
ligence led to the events of September 11th. If this assumption is wrong, then the limitation of indi-
vidual rights and the authorisation of police measures intended by the new law, which in the past
did not have the support of the majority of the Congress, will not lead to greater future security.38
2.5. Distorted risk perception – is the Biological Weapons Convention a victim of neglect?
Finally, the debate about biological weapons and their potential danger, currently focused on the
subject of bioterrorism, has one side effect that should be mentioned. The Biological Weapons Con-
vention (BWC) could be one of the first and, at same time, most dramatic victims of the current
preoccupation with the risks of biological terrorism. The BWC Review Conference, h ld from 19th
November to 7th December 2001, was adjourned until November 2002 after substantial American
sabotage attempts. This adjournment was the only way to avoid a failure of the review process.
Since the BWC is the most useful multilateral instrument currently available for countering the
threat of bioterrorism, failure would be disastrous.
2.5.1.Act 1: US rejection of the additional  protocol
The American rejection of the additional protocol in July 2001 left six years of diplomatic negotia-
tions to strengthen the BWC in pieces.39 The multilateral attempt to improve the enforcement of the
Convention by an additional protocol was rejected by the Bush administration after the chairman of
the negotiations presented the draft of a compromise text: the American government justified their
disapproval by claiming that the protocol was not going to achieve its goals and that its realisation
would pose a threat to American biotechnology as well as to pharmaceutical industries and the
national security of the US. In short, the US government was not convinced that the gain of infor-
38 See Laura Donohue/Jim Walsh: “Patriot Act – remedy for an unidentified problem”, San Francisco Chronicle,
30/10/2001.
39 See Jenni Rissanen: U ited States Reject Protocol, ACRONYM Institute, BWC Protocol Bulletin, 25/7/2001.
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mation relevant for non-proliferation purposes generated by the protocol would outweigh the poten-
tial damage it would cause.40
To find a new consensus amongst the states involved in the treaty before the next review confer-
ence would have been a Herculean task, even without the events of September 11th. Now, as most
important participating states focus on bioterrorism, agreement about the future course of action will
be even more difficult. BWC review conferences have been an important instrument in the past,
confirming the general view that a misuse of modern biotechnology in warfare is considered prohib-
ited according Article I of the BWC. Thus, the effects of this development are all the more serious. A
renewal of this consensual interpretation would be most desirable in view of the enormous progress
biotechnology has made. 41
2.5.2.Act 2: The Bush administration torpedoes the review conference
The Bush government presented ‘new’ suggestions on 1st N vember 2001 that, for the most part, are
neither new nor likely to lead to a consensus.42 Four of seven suggestions aim at internationally
coordinated measures, whereas the remaining three are thought to strengthen the national powers of
states working towards a ‘reinforcement’ of the BWC.
The United Nations should establish an effective procedure for the investigation of suspicious
outbreaks of illness and suspected use of BW’s in the international sphere. Several UN resolutions,
passed in 1987-9 were intended to place such a procedure under the responsibility of the UN Gen-
eral Secretary – they have so far not been applied. Were the American suggestion to strengthen the
procedural powers of the General Secretary then this would be, at best, a ‘peripheral reinforcement’
of the BWC. The UN resolutions mentioned all relate to the Geneva Convention of 1925, which
regulates the use of BW’s.
In addition, the Bush administration would like to see the establishment of procedures that de-
termine how violations of BWC regulations are dealt with. This suggestion in itself must come as a
blow to those who have been involved in the negotiations of the ad-hoc group for the strengthening
of the BWC over the last six years. Bush’s demand means, in plain language, starting again right
from the beginning, however, this time without a laboriously negotiated mandate that tried to inte-
grate different interests, but with clear preconditions set by the last remaining superpower.
In addition, the core of the central demand for strengthening the BWC on a national level is
contained in the Convention itself and thus is about 25 years old: The BWC member states should
integrate the prohibitions of the treaty into their national legislation, including punishment for viola-
tion. The Americans wish to include extradition clauses in this legislation. Again, the American line
40 See Department of State, Washington File, Text: Mahley Statement on Biological Weapons Protocol,
http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/006/eur307.htm.
41 See Malcolm Dando: Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, Appendix
13A, in: SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, 1999, id.: Genomics,
Bioregulators, Cell Receptors and Potential Biological Weapons, in Defense Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2001, pp.239-
258.
42 See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text: Bush Proposes Steps to Strengthen Biological Weapons
Pact, Washington, D.C., 1/11/2001.
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of sight is easily recognisable. The primary aim is not to strengthen multilateral mechanisms, such
as an international convention that would condemn the production or the use of bioweapons as crime
against humanity or an international organisation that would have to be newly founded. The primary
aim is to strengthen the right of individual states to claim the extradition of suspected bioterrorists so
that they can be brought before their own national courts.
The US administration’s remaining suggestions are exceedingly vague and are not designed to
contribute to the strengthening of cooperative and multilateral instittions. They aim at:
· obliging an improvement both in the control of illnesses and the mechanisms of sending
teams of experts to fight illnesses;
· creating sound national mechanisms for the control of the safety and the genetic engineer-
ing of pathogenic organisms;
· creating a universally valid ethical code of conduct for the life sciences;
· ensuring responsibility in every aspect of dealing with pathogenic organisms.
These suggestions lack three central components of the compromise developed for the additional
protocol that would have enabled many states to agree to them. An independent and authoritative
organisation for the control of the BWC should be realised in form of a) declarations, b) visits to
biological plants that would bring about an element of non-proliferation and would lead to a greater
extent of transparency in biological activities, and c) regulation of the field of international coopera-
tion controlling the peaceful use of the life sciences and guarantying certain aid measures that may
be needed.
For many developing countries, the last point represented a particular strength of the protocol.
Consolidated and detailed aid regulations dealing with the event of an unusual outbreak of illness or
presumed use of biological weapons would have been a powerful tool in the fight against bioter-
rorism and would have had the side effect of strengthening the BWC itself. Bearing in mind the
views expressed here, the sacrifice of the Convention to the current focus on terrorism with biologi-
cal weapons, ignoring all other aspects of the problems caused by bioweapons, is unacceptable.
Many states are of the opinion that the American negotiation strategy is both, incomplete and
undiplomatic, even confrontational. At the beginning of the review conference, the head of the US
delegation, John Bolton, accused six states, by name, of running secret offensive bioweapon pro-
grammes. Four of these are member states of the BWC (Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea), a further
one has signed the agreement (Syria), and only the sixth is not involved in the BWC (Sudan). 43
After the storm whipped up by this confrontational prelude had died down, it became apparent
which subjects were going to be critical for the success or failure of the conference. These included
(a) the question of reconciling national export controls and the offer of cooperation contained in
Article X of the agreement, (b) the question of how investigations of suspicious outbreaks of illness,
43 “U.S. Accuses Rogue States of Developing Bio Weapons”, W shi gton Post, 19/11/2001; “U.S. Publicly Accusing 5
Countries of Violating Germ-Weapons Treaty”, N w York Times, 19/11/2001.
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suspected use of biological weapons and suspected production plants should be conducted, and (c)
questions concerning violations of the treaty and their investigation.  Finally, the debate over the
mechanism by which further talks on the strengthening of the Convention would be conducted was
high on the conference agenda.44
In this context, the existence of the ad-hoc group that had tried to negotiate a verification proto-
col for the previous six and a half years was discussed. It was indeed this question that finally led to
the failure of the review conference. After 95 % of the final conference declaration had been agreed,
on the afternoon of the last conference day the US delegation presented a non-negotiable draft for the
final declaration, proclaiming the end of the ad-hoc group.
This suggestion not only went against the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the treaty
states; it even hit the US’s closest friends without warning or consultation. This suggestion can be
regarded as an emergency brake applied by the Bush administration after the public accusations at
the beginning of the conference, that some member states were violating the agreement with offen-
sive bioweapon programmes, failed to derail the conference. The combination of the contents, the
suggested wording and the way it was proposed practically guaranteed failure. This assured that
further negotiations over legally binding control measures, refused by the US, would not take place
until the conference met again at the end of 2002. As the US and the majority of the BWC member
states understand the purpose of the bioweapon control regime in such fundamentally different ways,
as reflected in the American behaviour, the expectations for the c tinuation of the conference was
set rather low from the outset.45
Yet, expectations for any meaningful outcome of the continuation of the Review Conference de-
creased even more, when US government representatives in September 2002 proposed to have the
resumed conference meet for a mere ten minutes and only decide to meet again in 2006 for the next
regular review. Although it is still unclear what exactly changed the US position back to its mini-
malist approach pursued the year before, the resumed conference was able to decide on a “pre-
cooked” decision for three annual meetings of experts and of the states parties to the BWC to be held
before the next Review Conference.46 The topics to be discussed during these meetings are predeter-
mined in the decision taken and represent the least common denominator revolving around the
original set of alternative measures to a BWC Protocol as proposed by the US in the fall of 2001.
With this compromise solution a complete failure of the review could be averted. However, the
adoption of a simple decision falls far short of the practice of previous Review Conferences to agree
on a detailed final document containing substantive interpretations of the BWC.
44 See Jenni Rissanen: Differences and Difficulties as Delegates Consider Wide Range of Proposals, BWC Review
Conference Bulletin, ACRONYM Institute, 30/11/2001, available at http://www. acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon4.htm.
45 Details about the course of th  last conference day and first reactions to the US fait accompli are found in Jenni Ris-
sanen: Anger After the Ambush: Review Conference Suspended After US Asks for AHG’s Termination, BWC Review
Conference Bulletin, ACRONYM Institute, 9/12/2001, http://www. acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon8.htm.
46 The draft decision was presented by the Chairman of the Review Conference, Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, on
the first day of the meeting and later circulated as conference document BWC/CONF.V/CRP.3, dated 6 November
2002.
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3 Terror using nuclear weapons and nuclear material?
To date, the scenario of nuclear weapons in terrorists’ hands has been considered extremely unlikely,
as it was thought that terrorists were technically incapable of producing an operating nuclear
weapon.47  Moreover, it was widely held that their interest in nuclear weapons was low, as compared
to other terrorist means. The events of September 11th have finally made it clear that mass murder
can be a terrorist’s objective. Nuclear weapons are particularly suited to maximising the number of
casualties. A nuclear explosion would be a next step in the escalation of terror.
Bin Laden, for example, has repeatedly announced his interest in nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction and has claimed to already possess some. He has probably also tried to
get hold of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is weapon-usable nuclear material. Whilst there
is no evidence that he has been successful, this cannot be ruled out. In recent years, there have been
many reports of attempts to smuggle nuclear material, the theft of entire nuclear weapons and the
increasing decay of the Russian nuclear complex, which thwarts reliable control of components and
material that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Some of these reports have turned
out to be false; others, however, point to a long-term danger that, at the moment, is still largely un-
derestimated.
In the following, an assessment is made of whether terrorists are capable of building or procur-
ing a nuclear explosive device. In this discussion, two different terms should be distinguished:48 A
nuclear weapon, as can be found in the arsenals of the nuclear states, has a complicated design that
is the result of years of development and many tests. Such a weapon is optimised in many respects.
For example, the mass of the nuclear material is minimised, the explosion energy is controlled pre-
cisely, several safety mechanisms are in place to prevent unintentional detonation and the weapons
are resistant to heat, pressure and radioactive radiation. Above all, such a nuclear weapon can be
delivered to its target by ballistic missiles. In contrast, a terrorist group could, at best, produce a
simple nuclear explosive device that would only be capable of generating a nuclear explosion. Like
the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it would have a simple design,
would require a large amount of nuclear material and would have a large mass that could only be
transported by ship, boat or lorry but not by a ballistic missile. Besides which, the creators of such a
bomb could never be entirely sure that it would really explode.
3.1. The theoretical know-how
During the Second World War, thousands of scientists and ancillary staff contributed to the creation
of the first crude nuclear explosive dev cs, in the Manhattan project. The American government
recruited the best scientists and enormous logistical and financial efforts were made. Would terror-
47 See for example Karl-Heinz Kamp, Nuklearterrorismus – hysterische Sorge oder reale Gefahr? Außenpolitik III/1995,
p. 211.
48 Tom Shea, presentation at the Workshop on Innovative Directions for the Future Development of IAEA Safeguards
Technology, Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Italy, 2-6/7/2001.
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ists now be in a position to construct such a nuclear explosive device without comparable efforts?
There is one important difference: The physicists of the Manhattan project did not even know if a
nuclear explosion would be possible, and years were spent on basic research and essential inven-
tions. They had to produce the nuclear material themselves. Furthermore, the operating procedures
had to be developed and studied.
Today, not only are the principles of nuclear weapons identified, the fundamental theories are
also published in detail and are, to some extent, even available on the Internet.49 Thes  publications
are not officially authorised and might contain mistakes in the detail. However, they are based on
information that has been declassified and that can be used to reveal and understand the physical
facts.50 Condemnation of the declassification is of no use – it is merely a consequence of the inevita-
ble scientific progress that has been made since the beginning of the nuclear age. Since those begin-
nings, the subject nuclear physics has been established, many textbooks written, numerous nuclear
plants designed and the and the functioning of nuclear weapons researched. Moreov r, many coun-
tries had ambitions to develop nuclear weapons in the 50’s and 60’s. Therefore, scientists studied
the relevant underlying theories. The physics of a crude nuclear explosive d vic is simple when
compared to the physics of a nuclear reactor. After a few semesters of study, an average physics
student will have sufficient knowledge to understand such a device. There was no way to avoid the
essential theoretical foundations becoming publicly known. Moreover, regulations implementing
exaggerated secrecy have counterproductive effects: they can impede nuclear disarmament and its
verification,51 they can be misused to hide mismanagement, corruption and mistakes and they can be
used to influence political decisions.52 H wever, they are to some extent useful in protecting infor-
mation that facilitates the prolif ration of nuclear weapons.53
3.2. The development of ignition technology
But there is still information that is kept secret, especially in relation to engineering. Many laborious
steps are between a basic understanding of the operating principles and an actual technical blue-
49 Examples are: Carey Sublette, Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions, Version 2.25: 9/8/2001,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/hew/Nwfaq/Nfaq0.html; and Gerhardt Locke, Aufbau und Funktionsweise von Kernspal-
tungswaffen, Bericht INT 25, Euskirchen 1982 (not available on the Internet).
50 An example of such a document containing declassified information is: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Declassi-
fication, Restricted Data Declassification Policy 1946 to the Present (RDD-6), 1/1/2000. This document was available
on the Internet during the Clinton administration. The following publication is amongst the first concerning the func-
tion of nuclear weapons to be declassified: Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer – The First Lectures on How To
Build an Atomic Bomb, Berkeley 1982 (written in 1943, declassified in 1965).
51 Russia, for example, refused to publish the composition of the plutonium that stems from Russian disarmed nuclear
weapons. In this way, the international cooperation for the inclusion of this material in civil disposal programmes is
impeded.
52 Edward Teller’s lobbying of Ronald Reagan with regard to SDI is an example for the latter.
53 The Clinton administration tried to define the boundary between secrecy and transparency in a way that, on the one
hand, the proliferation of the means of mass destruction is minimal and ‘national security’ is guaranteed and, on the
other hand, the democratic interest in transparency is taken into account. See the criteria: Openness Advisory Panel,
Responsible Openness: An Imperative for the Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.,
25/8/1997, http://vm1. hqadmin.doe.gov:80/seab/openness.pdf.
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print. It is not enough just to understand the theory. Terrorist organisations would have to acquire
special abilities and techniques in order to build even a simple nuclear explosive device. These in-
clude, for example, the generation of shock waves with the aid of high explosives, the handling of
fuel, electronics, radioactive material, radiochemistry and the precision mechanics of metallic ur-
nium or plutonium. Even these subjects are covered in detailed specialist publications that are avail-
able not only in libraries but also on the Internet. In principle, it is possible to study these publica-
tions and use them as a basis for acquiring the relevant capabilities. However, many crucial details
are kept secret, especially those that are based on experimental measurements rather than theory.
Development work would be necessary to work these out.
In principle, there are two different ignition techniques. Using the implosion method, a hollow
sphere of plutonium or HEU is imploded to create a so-called overcritical mass. When a neutron
enters this mass, a ch in reaction is started that will lead to a nuclear explosion. In the case of plu-
tonium, such a starting neutron will practically always be present, as plutonium generates initial
neutrons through the high rate ofspontaneous fission. HEU has a lower rate of spontaneous fission
and thus a lower n utron background. Therefore, in the case of HEU, neutrons will have to be added
artificially at the right point in time in order to start the chain reaction. A comparatively high com-
pression can be achieved using the implosion method, which means that large overcritical masses
can be achieved with relatively small amounts of material. The production of a warhead with this
method requires complete mastering of the technique of generating precise spherical shock waves.
This in turn requires experimental preliminary studies involving many conventional explosions that
would probably take several years.
Using the gun-type method, two non-critical masses of HEU are shot at one another to generate
an overcritical mass. This method was used by South Africa to build six warheads. It should be
noted that only HEU is suitable for this method. This is due to the time that passes until maximal
overcriticality is reached. Using the gun-type method, this period of time is on the scale of millisec-
onds and far longer than the few microseconds (thousandths of a millisecond) needed using the
implosion method. If plutonium were used, the chain reaction would start too early, due to its high
neutron background, leading to a small detonation on the scale of a conventional explosion. Com-
pression cannot be achieved using the gun-type method. Thus, larger masses of several tens of kilo-
grams are necessary and only a relatively small overcriticality can be achieved. Nevertheless, this
method can be sufficient to generate a nuclear explosion on the scale of the Hiroshima bomb. States
and terrorists would only choose this method if they were sure of having access to sufficient HEU.
It is not sufficient to simply ‘drop’ one part of HEU onto the other. Although HEU generates
fewer spontaneous neutrons than plutonium, they occur too frequently to allow such a long period of
time for the combination of the two parts. The danger of early ignition would be far too high. The
combination has to be achieved as quickly as possible, that is in a few milliseconds. The terrorists
would have to develop a technique to shoot the two parts at each other in a gun barrel, without them
bending out of line and getting stuck. This presents an engineering challenge that is not trivial,
considering the large masses involved, and which would presumably require months if not years of
preliminary experimental tests.
In principle, it remains possible for a highly motivated and financially well-endowed terror or-
ganisation to acquire the technical abilities necessary to manufacture an ignition mechanism for a
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nuclear explosive device. However, this would require enormous efforts. Various specialists would
have to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills in university studies abroad.
Revelations over the preparations undertaken for the attacks against the World Trade Center
show that terrorists are prepared to go this far to achieve their aims. The organisation would need
shelter for several years, where they can work undisturbed and carry out the necessary experiments.
Such a base could hardly be mobile, as a test site would be needed to carry out conventional explo-
sions, together with some research labs and offices. The work could only be done under the supervi-
sion of highly qualified physicists. For the development of the ignition mechanism, the handling of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) is not required. Thus, hiding the base would be com-
paratively easy. Research into conventional explosives is usually carried out in a military environ-
ment,and, therefore, hardly accessible for outsiders, for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the cover and
protection by a state like, for example, Afghanistan is required, as the existence of a base and the
experiments carried out in it would be noticed by nearby residents. Once a sta e comes under suspi-
cion, it will always face the  risk of secret services discovering the base. In the now abandoned
South African nuclear weapons programme, the development of the ignition technology represented
only a small part, requiring a correspondingly small amount of effort,54 and a frac ion of this effort
would probably be sufficient for terrorists.
3.3. The procurement of nuclear material
All deliberations so far made r late to the development of ignition technology. However, it is far
more difficult to get hold of the nuclear fuel. Nuclear material exists in many different forms. Of
these, only metallic plutonium or HEU can be used directly in nuclear weapons, without having to
be processed further. As a rough estimate, beginners would need at least 20 kg HEU or 10 kg pluto-
nium in order to build one warhead using the implosion method, as was used for the Nagasaki
bomb.55 A simpler construction principle was applied to the gun-type method used for the Hiroshima
bomb. Using this method, plutonium does not work and an estimated 50 kg of uranium are needed
for one bomb. A terrorist group would only choose the gun-type method if it was sure of having
access to enough HEU.
Globally, there are about 250 t of military plutonium and about 1,700 t of military HEU. Civil
stocks have to be added to this. Obviously, th s and other nuclear material is subjet to trict security
measures . Additionally, nuclear material located in non-nuclear weapon states is subject to controls
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called “safeguards”. Th se security measures
are designed to detect a theft as early as possible, leaving enough time for the international commu-
nity to agree on a line of action before a bomb is operational. In practice, in nearly all non-nuclear
54 David Albright, Corey Hinderstein, South Africa’s Nuclear Weaponization Efforts: Success n a Small-Scale, ISIS-
Working-Paper, 13/9/2001, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/ safrica.pdf.
55 This estimate is based on the assumptions that the implosion would not be perfect, the material would partially b  lost
in the production process and a reflector would probably be used. It is assumed that the HEU is more than 90% en-
riched. See A. Schaper, Zur Waffentauglichkeit verschiedener Uranbrennstoffe, working paper for the expert commit-
tee on the research reactor Garching, German Fed ral Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF), 5/3/1999.
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weapon states like Germany, all supplies are accurately registered. Thus, it is very unlikely that a
theft could go undiscovered.
The situation is different in states that possess nuclear weapons and are not subject to interna-
tional controls.56 Of these, the states of the former Soviet Union have been the subject of great con-
cern for many years, with regard to the security of nuclear material. It seems that an exact overview
of stocks has been lost or never existed in a sufficiently accurate form. Moreover, many plants and
deposits are not sufficiently secure. It is not known whether terrorists or third party states have al-
ready managed to get hold of nuclear material. However, it is certain that several attempts have been
made in the past, some involving bin Laden. Several cases were already uncovered in the mid 90’s,
where smugglers stole weapon-ready nuclear material, sometimes in kg amounts.57 In 1998, Russian
government members revealed that plans had been made to steal 18,5 kg of HEU from one of the
nation’s largest nuclear weapon plants. The plan was stopped before the material had left the plant.58
It is, however, perfectly possible that thefts have been carried out on other occasions that have
never been discovered. It is not known, whether potential thieves of nuclear material, smugglers and
recipients have already made contact. Thus, it is possible that a terrorist cache of sufficient nuclear
material to build a weapon already exists. We have no indication that this is really the case.
The problem of insecure nuclear material is not only confined to the former Soviet Union. Even
in the US, complaints about the limited security surrounding weapon-ready material have repeatedly
been filed, even though much stricter and more modern regulations concerning the physical protec-
tion of nuclear material are in place.59 It should be noted that the US, as nuclear weapon state, is not
subject to international controls. One instance where security concerns arose came from an event in
October 2000, when a group of ‘terrorists’, made up of army and navy personnel, managed to get
hold of sensitive nuclear material from the Los Alamos laboratories, during the course of a training
exercise.60 In the first decades after the invention of nuclear weapons, the recording of nuclear mate-
rials was still very incomplete. The US Department of Energy published a detailed account of the
history of American plutonium production in 1996.61 It was demonstrated that 2.5 tons of plutonium
are ‘missing’, which means that the stocks taken by measurement and the number calculated from
historical documents differ by 2.5 tons. This material has not necessarily been lost or stolen – this
56 These are the five official nuclear weapon states, USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China, and the unofficial
nuclear weapon states, India, Pakistan and Israel.
57 A. Schaper, Nuclear smuggling in Europe — real dangers and enigmatic deceptions, in: V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini
(ed.): Illegal nuclear traffic: risks, safeguards, and countermeasures, Proceedings of the International Forum, Sci-
ence for Peace Series, Vol. 4, Venice, 1998. Most cases that were discovered and published in Germany and Central
Europe in the 90’s turned out to be harmless, as the material used was not weapon-ready.
58 Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Harvard Project on Managing the Atom, Washington, DC, April 2000,
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/ pubs/Nextwave.
59 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst: A Report on Security
Problems at the Department of Energy (the Rudman Report), Washington, DC: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board, June 1999, http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/.
60 Stephen J. Hedges and Jeff Zeleny, Mock terrorists breached security at weapons plants, Chicago Tribune, 5/10/2001,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0110050267oct05.story.
61 Department of Energy, Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utiliza-
tion from 1944 to 1994, Washington, DC, February 1996.
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number could just indicate the extent to which the early recording of material was inexact. However,
what becomes clear is that it is not possible to determine whether material has been taken away in
the past. It can be assumed that such inaccuracies are even worse in Russia.
Metallic plutonium is difficult to process, due to its radiotoxic properties and its reactivity. A ter-
rorist group would be taking on substantial risks – of accidents and of health, as they would be
unable to gain practical experience of processing plutonium. However, it is assumed that they are
willing to put up with these risks. The handling of metallic uranium is slightly easier, however,
larger amounts are needed if a nuclear warhead is to be built with it. Should a terrorist already mas-
ter the ignition technique, then an operational weapon can be assembled quickly, once enough plu-
tonium or HEU comes their way.
The US American Department of Energy issued a warning in 1997:
“Several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of HEU, is
enough to make a bomb. With access to sufficient quantities of these materials,
most nations and even some sub-national groups would be technically capable of
producing a nuclear weapon…”62
3.4. The production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) in ally states
It can be ruled out that a terrorist group has the capability to produce plutonium or HEU. At ost,
only a state with appropriate resources could carry out such an endeavour, and it is doubtful whether
such a programme could be kept hidden for long. Large-scale nuclear plants are necessary, the pro-
curement and operation of which could not be kept a secret. All procedures for the enrichment of
uranium or for plutonium reprocessing leave traces in the environment. In case of suspicion, these
activities could be traced immediately as all plants, at least in non-nuclear weapon states, are subject
to IAEA safeguards. The production of uranium or plutonium needs extraordinarily high efforts, as
can be illustrated by the fact that Iraq employed thousands of members of staff for years in the 80’s
in order to manufacture HEU under cover. Nevertheless, only small amounts of HEU were produced.
At that ime, the IAEA inspections were less thorough and the extent of the production activities was
only discovered after the gulf war. Meanwhile, IAEA safeguards have been tightened and it is re-
garded as improbable that a similar case could go undiscovered today. As a consequence, activities
leading to the production of HEU or plutonium are likely to be revealed in time, even, for example,
in Afghanistan. As a consequence of the Iraq scandal, with activities being detected at such a late
stage, the industrial states now cooperate to observe international procurement activities. Moreover,
other pieces of information, for example from intelligence or from satellite imagery, are provided for
evaluation. The technique of collecting and collating scattered pieces of information and their inter-
pretation has improved immensely. The IAEA maintains a database in which such information is
collected and registered. Therefore, the IAEA is capable of drawing attention to suspicious facts at a
62 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-
0007, Washington, DC, January 1997, p. vii.
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very early stage.63 Routine inspections can be complemented with special inspections where appro-
priate. The civil nuclear activities of most countries are transparent.
There are, however, a small number of exceptions. Iraq is amongst these, as the IAEA has not
been present in this country since 1998.64 The enrichment plants that existed before the gulf war
have been rendered useless and all nuclear material found there has been taken abroad. An interna-
tional technical cooperation with Iraq in this field no longer exists and thorough observations are
carried out by satellite. However, the technical know-how is still present, presumably including
knowledge about ignition technology. Without controls, a small but significant risk remains that
Iraq has meanwhile obtained enough HEU and has decided to cooperate with a radical fundamen-
talist terrorist group.
A further exception is North Korea, which has attempted to produce plutonium in the past. These
activities were discovered by the IAEA, however, North Korea is not in compliance with its obliga-
tions, and therefore the IAEA is not able to reconstruct the past production. It cannot be ruled out
that North Korea is in possession of sufficient plutonium for several warheads. However, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that Pyongyang would cooperate with terrorists or that terrorists could get access to
this material or that terrorists could get access to this material.
Before South Africa signed up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 and submitted to IAEA
safeguards, it had produced large amounts of plutonium in its secret nuclear weapons programme.
Meanwhile, these stocks have been completely accounted for.65 It can be assumed, with a reasonable
degree of certainty, that there are no more undeclared hiding places. Today, an undiscovered theft is
just as unlikely as in the other non nuclear weapon states. However, some amounts might have been
covertly sold in the past, and they might be in the possession of criminals today. It has been re-
ported, for example, that bin Laden attempted to procure HEU of South African origin in
1993/1994.66 It is unknown whether he had any success.
In addition, it has for years been suspected that Iran is interested in secretly obtaining nuclear
weapons, particularly by the US. The American suspicion is based on the testimonies of arms deal-
ers, which refer to Iranian representatives, who enquired about the possibility of purchasing fission
material. It is also based on Tehran’s attempts to buy enriched uranium in Kazakhstan and on the
purchase of dual-use goods that might indicate an interest in the centrifuge technique. This has been
confirmed by secret services from other countries. It has been reported that the German Federal
Export Office prohibited any delivery to the Sharaf University in Tehran in 1996, after this university
63 K. Chitumbo, Information Analysis in the Strengthened Safeguards System, keynote presentation at the Symposium on
International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, 29/10 – 2/11/2001, proceedings in
preparation.
64 Katja Frank, Annette Schaper, Das Nichtverbreitungsregime in der Krise? Massenvernichtungswaffen in Indien,
Pakistan, Nordkorea und Irak, Friedensgutachten 1999, eds. Bruno Schoch, Ulrich Ratsch and Reinhard Mutz, p. 228,
Münster 1999.
65 Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon, Demetrius Perricos, Nuclear Verification in South Africa, IAEA Bulletin, Vol.
37, No. 1, March 1995.
66 Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden, CNS Report, 14/3/2001,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm; A Brownfeld, Bin Ladin's activities exposed in New York trial, Jane's
Terrorism & Security Monitor, 14/3/2001, http://newsite.janes.com/ secu-
rity/international_security/news/jtsm/jtsm010314_1_n.shtml.
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had attempted to purchase pieces of equipment for the manufacture of centrifuges. Another indicator
is Iran's start of constructing a uranium enrichment plant that has recently been revealed.67 How-
ever, the suspicion against Iran has never been proven. It is assumed that there are competing politi-
cal fractions in Iran, some of them interested in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and pre-
venting the development of nuclear weapons or the support of nuclear terrorism, others aiming at the
contrary.
3.5. Nuclear weapons and material from Pakistan?
The case of Pakistan merits particular attention. It has a small arsenal of nuclear weapons and ha
produced larger amounts of HEU. Its nuclear capacity is sometimes polemically referred to as the
‘Islamic bomb’. However, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was initially independent of
religious motives or fundamentalism. Rather, it was initiated by the complex relationship with India.
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed that it would not pass on any of its nuclear weapons and that it
would not cooperate with other states in this field.
Little is known, however, about Pakistani national security measures. The Taliban and radical
terrorists are met with sympathy by parts of the population. It is unknown whether religious fanatics
could get access to nuclear material and could pass it on to terrorists. Two retired nuclear physicists,
who participated in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, were arrested at the end of Oc-
tober 2001.68 They are Taliban sympathisers, who had recent close contact to the f rmerAfghan
government. It is not clear whether they have passed on nuclear material. They were released after a
few days, although the case will be investigated further.
The current and former Pakistani governments would not support terrorists. Whether they are
capable of preventing theft, however, remains unknown. In Pakistan, the army has always had con-
trol over the nuclear activities, and the various civilian governments were only marginally involved.69
The October 1999 coup eliminated the last remaining civilian influence. The army may sympathise
with the Taliban in the same way as the civilian population and this support might increase, de-
pending on how the war in Afghanistan develops. There are reports claiming that Pakistani officers
helped protect the Taliban against American air strikes, which would be strictly against the orders of
their government leader, general Pervaiz Musharraf.70
At present, Pakistan possesses 585 – 800 kg HEU and several kilograms of plutonium. This
amount would be enough for an estimated 30 – 50 warheads.71 The Pakistani government assures
that it is in full control of this nuclear material and of its nuclear weapons. However, there are indi-
67 Washington Post, Sources Say Iran Lays Groundwork For Nuclear Bombs, December 19, 2002; Page A26.
68 BBC News, 25/10/2001, Pakistan holds nuclear scientists, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
south_asia/newsid_1619000/1619252.stm.
69 Gaurav Kampani, The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia, CNS Reports,
October 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/gaurav.htm.
70 Jon Wolfsthal: "U.S. Needs A Contingency Plan For Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal", Los Angeles Times, 16/10/2001.
71 David Albright, Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex, Paper for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference,
25-27/10/2001, Warrenton, Virginia, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ terrorism/ stanleypaper.html.
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cations that their physical protection is inadequate. For example, a year ago already, Pakistan asked
the US for assistance to improve the physical protection of all nuclear material.72 The parts contai-
ing nuclear material and the ignition mechanisms of Pakistani nuclear weapons are apparently
stored in different locations.71 However, they are not protected against accidental detonation nor
equipped with “Permissive Action Links” – protective devices preventing unauthorised ignition. If
terrorists were to get hold of a Pakistani nuclear weapon, then they would be able to detonate it.
This, at least, is less likely to be the case for Russian nuclear weapons. The loc ti  of Pakistani
sites are kept secret, in contrast to those of the recognised nuclear weapon states that attract attention
because of their high degree of physical protection. The reason for this secrecy is that the physical
protection in place would be unable to withstand a significant attack. Immediately after the Septem-
ber 11th attacks, the nuclear weapons components were transferred to other secret locations in Paki-
stan. The Pakistani government feared that the storage sit s could be chosen as a target by terrorists.
These transfers also served the purpose of removing control over the nuclear weapons from religious
hardliners inside the military.73
A better degree of physical protection would decrease the risk of attack and theft by external
forces. Therefore, cooperation with Pakistan in this area should be considered. However, even then
the risk will remain that insiders might steal material or warheads and cooperate with outsiders. It is
unknown, how are controlled and how the material accountancy works.  At least, modern material
accountancy techniques can create a greater internal transparency. Therefore, it would be sensible to
cooperate in this aspect too. Moreover, the danger remains that, in the event of another civil war or a
putsch, the whole Pakistani nuclear complex could fall into the hands of religious fundamentalists.
Thus, international efforts should be focussed towards the promotion of stability in Pakistan, in order
to prevent a change to a fanatical government.
Cooperation with Pakistan that aims to secure the nuclear complex and the nuclear weapons
within will have political side effects that must be taken into account: S ch cooperation might imply
an indirect acceptance of Pakistan’s status as a nuclear state and, thus, might be in contravention of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly if assistance is given with regard to Permissive Action
Links. Safer nuclear weapons might lower the threshold for their use, so increasing the risk of a
nuclear war in South Asia. India would probably demand a similar treatment if cooperation with
Pakistan was undertaken. The question has been raised in public debate in the US, as to whether, in
the event of a coup d’etat, the US should invade Pakistan, to secure the nuclear weapons and the
nuclear complex.74. However, the political consequences of such a measure in the region could
hardly be controlled. Such action would be considered extremely provocative by other Islamic states.
Therefore, this suggestion should rather be considered as playing with fire. Such action would
probably result in a dramatically increased number of terror attacks. India would probably take
advantage of such a situation in order to strengthen its position with respect to other conflicts with
Pakistan. It is doubtful whether India’s activities would match Western interests. China does not
72 Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project Roundtable,
2/10/2001. Transcript: http://www.ceip.org/files/events/Paktranscript.asp.
73 Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons; Washington Post Foreign Service, Sunday, 11/11/2001; p. A01,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9038-2001Nov10.html.
74 Jon Wolfsthal: "U.S. Needs A Contingency Plan For Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal", Los Angeles Times, 16/10/2001.
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have a vested interest in the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism in the region; however, a
strong US supremacy would not be tolerated in the long term. The greatest danger lies in the possi-
bility that, before being crushed, putschists might use the weapons.
3.6. Bin Laden’s procurement activities
For several years, there have been growing indications that Bin Laden w s attempting to get hold of
weapons of mass destruction. He openly admitted that he did not exclude the use of such weapons in
an interview in 1998. He claimed that it was “a religious duty to acquire these weapons and a sin not
to try”. Should he gain possession of such weapons then he would “thank God who had enabled him
to do this”.75 His interest covered nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; but his first attempts
apparently concentrated on the procurement of nuclear weapons.76
An important source of information is a defector, named Jarmal Ahmad al-Fadl, a Sudanese who
is is said to have had close contact to Bin Laden.77 In 2001, he was the main witness in the court
proceedings against bin Laden, with respect to the 1998 bomb attacks on US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. He fled to the US in 1996, when he feared that the terror organisation would disci-
pline him, because of financial irregularities. He has been kept in US custody ever since. He pro-
vided exhaustive descriptions of attempts to get hold of uranium and also described in detail the
organisational structure of the terror group. Osama bin Laden and the Sudanese government denied
any contact with Jarmal Ahmad al-Fadl. Moreover, many doubt his credibility and his character.
These doubts are based on a series of criminal activities in his past and on the ease with which he
ignores his previous religious convictions in favour of financial gain. On the other hand, it can
hardly be believed that he has invented such a complex web of lies, most of which incriminate him-
self, only to harm bin Laden. Bin Laden’s motivation to keep his distance to al-Fadl is obvious, as is
that of the Sudanese government. Other witnesses have confirmed details of his reports.
Jarmal Ahmad al-Fadl is thought to have been involved in bin Laden’s attempts to procure sev-
eral kilograms of HEU from South Africa in 1993. He claims to have seen a container of material
whilst negotiating with suppliers in Sudan. The negotiations mainly concerned testing the quality of
the uranium. He does not know if this testing was actually carried out or if the purchase was com-
pleted. It is possible that the organisation has gained possession of sufficient HEU through similar
deals. At the end of the 80’s, a number of press reports appeared about bin Laden’s attempts to get
hold of nuclear material, in order to build a bomb, however not all are reliable. It was claimed that
he employed ‘hundreds of Soviet scientists’ to build a homemade reactor and it was said that works
75 Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama bin Laden, ABC News, December 1998, http://abcnews.go.
com/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_binladen1_981228.html.
76 Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden, CNS Report, 14/3/2001,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm; A Brownfeld, Bin Ladin's activities exposed in New York trial, Jane's
Terrorism & Security Monitor, 14/3/2001, http://newsite.janes.com/ security/ interna-
tional_security/news/jtsm/jtsm010314_1_n.shtml.
77 Ibid.
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were in progress to build a bomb smaller than a backpack.78 These details are no doubt exaggerated
as such efforts would not go undiscovered and are beyond the capabilities of an organisation like bin
Laden’s. However, it cannot be ruled out that terror organisations have taken possession of sufficient
plutonium or HEU and have carried out experiments regarding the weapon technology. In October
2000, a member of the Russian Security Council confirmed that Russia had stopped an attempt by
the Taliban to recruit a Russian nuclear expert.79.
Documents recently found in Afghanistan indicate that Al Qaeda’s procurement activities have
not yet progressed very far. The documents include general descriptions of radiological weapons and
basic sketches about the operating principles of nuclear weapons. The information contained therein
does not exceed the general knowledge that can also be found on the Internet.80
3.7. Smuggling of complete nuclear weapons?
Bin Laden is said to have tried to get hold of complete nuclear weapons.81 Such rumours have re-
peatedly appeared in the press in recent years. These nuclear weapons are thought to be so-called
‘rucksack bombs’, that is, particularly small and compact explosive devices that can be transported
easily.
General Alexander Lebed caused a stir when he claimed that Russia had lost 100 1-kiloton
rucksack bombs in September 1997.82 These weapons are particularly small, mobile and are not
equipped with the standard security measures against unauthorised use. They were designed for use
by special units to carry out sabotage acts in times of war. Several of these weapons were located in
states of the former Soviet Union and might not have been returned to Russia. Lebed was about to
investigate this matter when president Yeltsin dismissed him in October 1996. A member of his
fact-finding committee claimed that no evidence of missing weapons was found but stated that the
investigation had remained incomplete, as the Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic States had not been
examined yet. A former adviser to the president, Alexander Yablokov, confirmed the existence of
such special weapons, although the Russian government has always denied that such ‘rucksack
bombs’ exist.83 However, the various official statements partly contradict each other. Therefore, the
78 Emil Torabi, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Weapons,” Muslim Magazine (Winter 1998); http://www. muslimmag.org, cited
in footnote 72.
79 Matthew Bunn, George Bunn, Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage, IAEA Special Session on Com-
bating Nuclear Terrorism, 30/10/2001, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/ Nuclear_Terrorism/bunn02.pdf.
80 Bryan Bender, US: " igns Seen Of Efforts To Get Terror Weapons", The Boston Globe, 17/1/2002.
81 Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden, CNS Report, 14/3/2001,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm; A Brownfeld, Bin Ladin's activities exposed in New York trial, Jane's
Terrorism & Security Monitor, 14/3/2001, http://newsite.janes.com/ security/ interna-
tional_security/news/jtsm/jtsm010314_1_n.shtml.
82 Ongoing speculation about missing Russian 'suitcase nukes', Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 19, October 1997,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/19nukes.htm; Scott Parrish and John Lepingwell, Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose?, The
Story Behind the Controversy, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report, November 1997,
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83 Adam Dolnik, America’s Worst Nightmare? Os ma Bin Laden and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Yaderny Kontrol
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official denial is not very convincing and it can be assumed that such weapons really exist. In the
60’s, the US built hundreds of such weapons and it is unlikely that the then Soviet Union did not
level the score and do the same.
Lebed’s claim is not new, but striking as it stems from a person with access to information about
nuclear weapons. It was already reported in the Russian press in 1995 that Chechnyan separatists
had tried to get hold of nuclear weapons. It is not known if they were successful. Officially, Russia
claims that all nuclear weapons are accurately recorded. This claim cannot be verified, as there are
no international agreements in place that provide transparency about all stocks.
Rumours that terrorist organisations have already got hold of nuclear explosive devices cannot
be disproved. For example, the Israeli secret service reported in 1998 that an agent in Kazakhstan
received over 2 millions pound sterling and promised to supply a ruck ack bomb within two years.
According to Arab sources, bin Laden procured about 20 Russian nuclear weapons in Chechnya, in
the same year, against a payment of $30 million and 2 tons of opium in Chechnya. Allegedly, he
plans to dismantle these warheads and use them to build new, small tactical nuclear weapons.84
Although Afghan opium is thought to play a role in procurement activities, the reliability of these
reports is doubtful, as the manufacturing of homemade rucksack bombs cannot be carried out by an
organisation such as Al Qaeda. Miniature explosive device needed for rucksack bombs are the
result of technical optimisation that can only be achieved by years of experimenting, including nu-
merous nuclear tests. It is impossible to assemble such weapons with the same simple methods that
are used to build simple nuclear devices. Despite reports about the security of Russian nuclear plants
and arsenals, it is doubtful whether there are any nuclear weapons left in Chechnya. It is even more
unlikely that weapons could have been smuggled into this country. Russia claims to have withdrawn
all nuclear weapons from most Soviet republics including Chechnya before the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Ultimately however, certainty cannot be achieved, as it is not known how many nuclear
weapons are in Russian possession and where they are deployed.
Countless reports in recent years have been proven false. Therefore, reports of this kind have to
be treated with caution. However, if terrorists do have some complete nuclear weapons, the question
should be asked whether these ruck ack bombs really lack a security device preventing their igni-
tion, as Lebed declared. If a security device is present, it is unlikely to be overcome by the terrorists.
Under normal circumstances, ignition is only possible with the aid of an electronic signal or a code
from Moscow. Should the security devices be present, the warhead would have to be dismantled in
order to reconstruct it. Moreover, it should be considered whether the nuclear material that is con-
tained in the warhead is still suitable for use in a weapon. As a rule, nuclear weapon plutonium has
to be replaced every five to ten years. The material in the ‘forgotten’ Russian warheads has certainly
not been replaced. Therefore, a rucks ck bomb – without securitydevice - will only release a rela-
tively ‘low’ energy.
84 Cited in footnote 72.
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3.8. Types of threat
If terrorist really have nuclear warheads, they will be able to use them in two different ways: they
could attempt to kill as many civilians as possible, without advance warning; or they could try to use
the weapons for blackmail. In either case, they would have to transport them to their target. The use
of missiles can be ruled out. The technical hurdles standing in the way of the procurement or con-
struction of missiles are much too high. Besides, any nuclear explosive device that could be built by
terrorists would be much too heavy for transport in a missile. Even if terrorists have operating
rucksack bombs and missiles, they would not have the technical ability to detonate the warhead in
the right moment. Even states that the US likes to regard as threats against which an anti-missile
shield has to be built are not actually capable of reaching American territory with missiles.85 There-
fore, bombs would have to be carried by ship, lorry or plane. Transport by air is likely to be discov-
ered and success is improbable. Therefore, the terrorists would probably not choose this means of
transport. However, there remains the option of transferring one or more explosive devices by sea or
by land, in which case the probability of a discovery would be quite low.
If terrorists attempted blackmail, they would have to substantiate their claims of possessing nu-
clear explosive d vices. This could by achieved by detonating one bomb and then threatening to
detonate others. Alternatively, technical drawings, photos or samples of nuclear material could be
sent that could be used by experts to determine whether the threat should be taken seriously.
A variant of nuclear terrorism that is technically much less challenging would be the use of a ra-
diological weapon instead of a nuclear explosive device. Such a weapon is detonated by a conven-
tional explosion and distributes highly radioactive material. Whole neighbourhoods could, thus, be
made inhabitable for many years. Plutonium and HEU, which are used in nuclear weapons, are not
only difficult to get hold of but are also not very radioactive. Therefore, they are not very suitable for
such a radiological weapon. A more obvious material to use would be spent fuel elements, which are
produced by all civil nuclear power stations. However, theft of spent fuel elements is extremely
difficult; they are highly radioactive and would quickly release a lethal dose of radiation if not ade-
quately shielded. Moreover, they are very heavy and bulky. The theft of such elements would require
the use of an appropriate form of transport.86 I  Ge many, they are transported by rail in specially
designed "Castor Containers" It i  difficult to imagine terrorists organising a raid to capture and
remove such containers. In non-nuclear states, all spent fuel elements are registered by the IAEA
and a theft would almost certainly be quickly discovered. It would be easier to get hold of high-level
radioactive waste, emanating from reprocessing plants, or special radioactive materials and solu-
tions, used in civil research institutes and hospitals. Reprocessing plants in non-nuclear or Euratom
states87 are, however, tightly controlled. Moreover, detectors are placed at all entrances and exits and
85 The sparsely populated Alaska might be the exception as North Korean missiles might be able to reach it. See George
N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “Future challenges to ballistic missile defense”, IEEE Spectrum , September 1997,
pp. 60-68.
86 This is why the concept of the ‘spent fuel standard’ is used in the discussion of the disposal of plutonium that stems
from disarmed nuclear weapons. If the plutonium has been transformed into a state that is equivalent to that of a spent
fuel element, then it is acknowledged to correspond to the spent fuel standard. At this stage, the disarmament process is
to be regarded as completed.
87 Euroatom monitors the civil nuclear power stations of two nuclear weapon states, Great Britain and France.
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at other locations that can register even small doses of radioactivity. Nevertheless, there is no way of
ruling out the possibility of groups of staff conspiring to illegally remove small amounts of liquid
radioactive waste. A more plausible scenario is the theft of material from those less secure plants
that are not subject to international controls.88
Liquid radioactive waste could be added to drinking water, so contaminating the entire area fed
by a particular supply. A radiological weapon would initially cause few casualties, depending on
where it was detonated. However, the contamination would have long-term consequences that would
be dreadful. It is thought that, in 1980, Iraq produced and tested conventional bombs filled with
radioactive material, presumably from spent fuel elements.89 However, no such weapons have yet
been used.
Another widely aired scenario involves a passenger plane, with full fuel tanks, being crashed
into a nuclear power station. In fact, nuclear plants have frequently been the focus of terrorist and
criminal interest. Attempts at invading, attacking or threatening nuclear power stations have been
reported in Argentina, Russia, Lithuania, South Africa, South Korea and even in the US and
France.90 In Russia, acts of terror are feared from Chechnyan terrorists; in France, it is Algerians
who are suspected of sabotaging a nuclear power station. Not all such attempts are classified as
large-scale acts of terror, as some of them are ‘only’ sabotage attempts by discontented staff or bomb
scares in nuclear power stations. There have, however, been cases of threatened suicide attacks by
plane hijackers, as, for example, in November 1972, when three hijackers threatened to bring a
plane down on a nuclear research plant in Oak Ridge.91
The containment design of German nuclear power stations does in fact take into account the pos-
sibility of a combat aircraft crashing but not of a plane with full fuel tanks. An IAEA spokesperson
recently confirmed that this also applies to other countries.92 The containment would probably not
withstand such an attack. The core of the reactor is unlikely to be hit but the cooling system might be
destroyed. Additional failure of the emergency cooling system, which is designed to flood the reactor
in such a situation, could lead to overheating of the core and, therefore, to a Chernobyl-type catastro-
phe. If terrorists succeeded in releasing the radioactive contents of a nuclear power station, whole
regions would be rendered uninhabitable. Such an incident at the German nuclear power station at
Biblis would affect most of the Hessen region, including, in the event of south-westerly winds, the
Rhine-Main Valley (including cities like Frankfurt etc). However, the terrorists would have to be
88 States that are not subject to international controls of their plants are the US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel.
The levels of physical protection in these states differ to a great extent.
89 Glenn Zorpette, Steve Miller, Unconventional Nuclear Weapons, IEEE Spectrum Online, November 2001,
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/nov01/nterr.html.
90 Oleg Bukharin, Problems of Nuclear Terrorism, The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control,
p. 1, Spring 1997; Oleg Bukharin, Upgrading Security at Nuclear Power Plants in the Newly Independent States, The
Nonproliferation Review, p. 28, winter 1997; Three Mile Island Alert, http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html.
91 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: Reactors & Radiological Attacks After September 11, IAEA Special Session on
Combating Nuclear Terrorism, 30/10/2001, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/
Press/Focus/Nuclear_Terrorism/cameron.pdf.
92 William J. Kole, Global atomic agency confesses little can be done to safeguard nuclear plants, Associated Pres,
19/9/2001, http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/200109/ 09192001/ ap_45005. asp.
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capable of hitting the reactor shield vertically, in a nosedive, rather than just scraping it from the
side. This is a far greater challenge than directing a plane into a high building.
3.9. Minimising the risks
The possibility that terrorists either have or are close to having nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.
In addition to the current anti-terrorist armoury, strategies exist that would, at least in the long term,
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.
These include, first and foremost, international cooperation to improve the security of nuclear
material in Russia. In many nuclear plants, physical protection and nuclear material accountancy fall
below defined ‘Western standards’. The quantities and location of plutonium and HEU stocks re-
main unknown. There is estimated to be about 450 tons of military and civil plutonium and over
1700 tons of HEU.93 Much of this material is in the hands of the five officially recognised nuclear
weapon states, but 1306 kg of civil HEU is spread amongst a further 27 countries, some of which
harbour quantities sufficient to produce a warhead.94 The physical protection and security of nuclear
plants varies considerably from one country to the next, as do the lists of scenarios against which
plants have to be protected. In some countries, such lists do not even consider the possibility of
terrorism or sabotage.95 There is no international treaty, committing states to protect their weapon-
ready material from theft or their nuclear plants from sabotage. The only relevant treaty is the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material that lays down rules for material that is to
be transported internationally. This does not apply to material or plants that are used, stored or
transported nationally.
It will also be necessary to cooperate with the three de facto nuclear weapon states, India, Paki-
stan and Israel, which do not take part in the non-proliferation treaty, to increase the security of their
nuclear facilities and materials. This will be a political tightrope walk as, on the one hand, it will be
necessary to avoid indirectly giving these states the status of nuclear weapon states but, on the other,
practical steps are needed to protect the most sensitive plants and materials in particular. It is, for the
moment, unlikely that these states will allow international controls. Controls that might be accepted
in future would only apply to civil, not military, nuclear energy. Nevertheless, good physical protec-
tion and precise bookkeeping are also vital in the military field, to secure nuclear weapons against
unauthorised use. The easiest approach would be an informal cooperation between these states and
the recognised nuclear weapon states, this being at a technical rather than a political level.
Following the September 11th attacks, the scenarios of threat against nuclear power stations have
to be reviewed. To date, the possibility that terrorists might aim at mass murder or would be pre-
pared to commit suicide has not been considered. Study of the September 11th attacks demonstrate
93 David Albright/Frans Berkhout/William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 – World Inventories,
Capabilites and Policies, SIPRI (Oxford University Press), 1997, brought up to date with reference to the Institute of
Science and International Security (ISIS): http://www.isis-online.org.
94 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Research Reactors in the World, IAEA-RDS-3, september 2000.
95 George Bunn, Raising International Standards for Protecting Nuclear Materials from Theft and Sabotage, Nonprolif-
eration Review, Summer 2000, p. 146.
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that preparations can be carried out over a number of years and means can be found and used that
have not previously been considered. Terrorists might regard nuclear materials and plants as ideal
targets. Such possibilities have to be considered in developing new scenarios. States have to cooper-
ate to harmonise their procedures and to achieve the highest possible level of physical protection. It
would be appropriate to cooperate with the IAEA, which is involved in a variety of activities aimed
at reducing these risks. These include the creation of a databank of threats of nuclear terrorism96 and
special training programmes for physical protection and for the analysis of threats.97
As long as material remains in a weapon-ready state, there is a great risk that it could fall into
the wrong hands.
An international plan for the disposal of excess weapons plutonium is in danger because of a
lack of interest on the part of the participating states.98 Additionally, international initiatives (in
particular the German one), designed to combat the smuggling of nuclear material and to improve
the safety of Russian nuclear plants, are not at all sufficient. Assigning a higher priority to such
initiatives would be an important step in reducing the probability of nuclear terrorism.
A further problem is the lack of an overview of existing nuclear weapons. Little is known about
the number and location of Russian nuclear weapons. This is especially true for so-called actical
nuclear weapons, which are still not subject to an arms control treaty. The dangers of such weapons
are grossly underestimated.99 Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, some of these are old and are poorly
protected against theft and unauthorised use. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons are subject to
control at a lower level in the military hierarchy. At present, the US still has 970 tactical nuclear
weapons. Some of these are based outside the US, including in Germany. It is estimated that about
5000 tactical nuclear weapons are still deployed in Russia. These have been given a higher political
priority in recent years.100 A  arms controls are not in place, transparency of existing stocks does not
exist. In 1993, the nuclear states declined a proposal by the German Foreign Minister to implement a
UN register of all nuclear weapons.101 This proposal could be revived. An arms control treaty that
includes the registration and disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the risk of theft.
96 George Anzelon, Improving the Knowledge Base on Nuclear Terrorism Nuclear Terrorism Threats, IAEA Special
Session on Combating Nuclear Terrorism, 30/10/2001, http://www.iaea.org/worldat
om/Press/Focus/Nuclear_Terrorism/anzelon.pdf.
97 Richard Hoskins, IAEA Material Security Programme - Threat Assessments, IAEA Special Session on Combating
Nuclear Terrorism, 30/10/2001, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/ Nuclear_ Terrorism/hoskins.pdf.
98 A. Schaper, Deutsche Abrüstungshilfe für russisches Waffenplutonium – Ein Plädoyer, Friedens-gutachten 2001, Ed.
Reinhard Mutz, Bruno Schoch, and Ulrich Ratsch, p. 283; LIT-Verlag, Münster 2001.
99 William C. Potter/Nikolai Sokov/Harald Müller/Annette Schaper, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control,
UNIDIR Research Report, Geneva, 2000.
100 Some Russian politicians and decision makers have suggested increasing the number of tactical nuclea weapons
based in Central Asia, in order to replace conventional systems that are in urgent need of maintenance, funds for
which are not available. American plans for a missile defence system have also contributed to the renaissance of tac-
tical nuclear weapons in Russia.
101 K. Kinkel, German 10-point initiative for nuclear non-proliferation, UN General Assembly, 48th Session, First
Committee, Agenda item 71 (c), November 8, 1993; Harald Müller: The Nuclear Weapons Register – a Good Idea
Whose Time Has Come, PRIF Reports, No. 51, 1998
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4 Comparison of biological and nuclear terrorism
The above discussion demonstrates significant differences between biological and nuclear terrorism.
For terrorists aiming at mass murder, a nuclear explosion would be the next logical step, with the
consequences being likely to exceed those of the September 11th attacks. The consequences of a
radiological weapon would be equally devastating. The construction of a simple nuclear explosive
device or, in particular, of a radiological weapon would be easier than is commonly assumed. The
greatest technical hurdle would be the procurement of nuclear material. Al Qaeda showed interest in
nuclear terrorism but its preparations did not reach an advanced stage. Should a future terror organi-
sation develop similar interests, it could, as long as it enjoys the protection of a state, engineer an
operating nuclear warhead or, more easily, a radiological weapon in only a few years. However, the
procurement of nuclear material is a precondition. Therefore, preventative measures should focus on
the protection of nuclear materials.
In comparison, the technical uncertainties linked to the procurement of biological weapons are
greater. It seems that terrorists find it technically difficult to generate comparable havoc and de-
struction with biological weapons. Therefore, these remain a less suitable next step, after the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, unless terrorists can manage to produce and effectively spread a pathogen that
causes an infectious disease and, therefore, an epidemic. The example of the Aum sect undermines
the old paradigm that terrorists disapprove of biological weapons, however, it also demonstrates that
large-scale efforts in this direction do not necessarily bring success. As concluded from the interview
cited above, bin Laden’s terror organisation does not seem to have any interest in bioweapons.102 The
September 11th terrorists are characteristically different from those who attempt to use biological
weapons, such as the Aum sect or the sender of the anthrax letters.
Since September 11th, the arm control debates related to biological and nuclear weapons have be-
come focused on terrorism. In some respects, international measures to fight terrorism have bene-
fited from this. A good example is the Nunn-Lugar programme, which has existed for ten years and
which aims to protect material from dismantled nuclear weapons. Its funds were cut drastically in
the last US budget. Not only have these cuts now been cancelled, the funds available to the pro-
gramme have even been increased.
The Nunn-Lugar programme only aims at informal cooperation and at measures that can be can-
celled at any moment. The Bush administration has stood in the way of arms control measures re-
lating to biological and nuclear weapons that could provide further important instruments. The most
useful multilateral instrument available today is the BWC, which could be used to build a united
front against the dangers of bioterrorism, amongst others. In the field of nuclear weapons, control
and disarmament regimes need to be stabilised and extended. Transparency of all stocks and the
irreversibility of existing measures are key objectives. This can only be achieved if states agree to
commit themselves. A treaty that could play an important role in creating transparency is the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty, (FMCT), which aims to end the production of fissile material for nuclear
explosives. This has been awaiting negotiation by the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva for
102 See footnote 27.
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several years. The Bush administration shows no interest in these negotiations, nor in the Test-Ban
Treaty, which they do not want to see ratified and which they even undermine by announcing prepa-
rations for new nuclear tests.103
103 Department of Defense, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 9/1/2002, http://www. de-
fenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.
